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A POLÍTICA INDUSTRIAL CHINESA NA 
GEOPOLÍTICA DA ERA DA INFORMAÇÃO: 
O CASO DOS SEMICONDUTORES
RESUMO: Esse artigo examina a crescente importância da indústria de semicondu-
tores como uma tecnologia estratégica no moderno sistema industrial e na guerra con-
tem porânea, além de analisar a evolução desta indústria na China, bem como a política 
industrial chinesa em semicondutores seguida nos últimos anos. Revisa-se a interpre-
tação chinesa da “revolução nos assuntos militares” e a percepção de seu atraso tecno-
lógico e possibilidades de catch-up e de evolução nos segmentos mais sofisticados desta 
cadeia produtiva através de firmas domésticas e tecnologia autóctone.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: China; política industrial; semicondutores; comércio estraté-
gico; mudança tecnológica.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Across the centuries, the control over technical progress has been an essential di-
mension of national power. Manufacturing and military might depend on national 
technical capabilities to produce and create new goods, infrastructure and weapons. 
Public investment in science and technology and other governmental industrial poli-
cies aimed to induce private investment in new industries and technologies have been 
the most persistent and predominant (although not necessarily acknowledged) lever 
for innovation and technical progress. Consequently, they have also been the lever for 
national competitive advantage creation among advanced countries. These countries 
systematically and politically exert control over new technologies, particularly those 
of dual use (civil/military), through secrecy and exclusivist policies, such as power 
policy.
In their efforts of industrialization, developing countries aim to reduce their tech-
nological backwardness through state-led industrial policies and fast growing invest-
ment rate. Technological catch-up by domestic firms through borrowing technologies 
in import substitution production or by joint ventures with transnational corporations 
– in areas where the barriers for importing technologies were higher – has been a 
common dimension of industrialization followed by fast growth in East Asian coun-
tries (homespun or export-led), and particularly in China since its opening to the 
international market. These technological opportunities were higher when different 
generations of technologies prevailed, favoring diffusion, and lower when cumulative-
ness concentrated innovation capacity in leading economies. Hence, industrialization 
through copy and borrowing technologies is easier in mature technologies, in those 
that property rights are not restrictive and where low labor costs are a competitive 
advantage. Industrialization through imitation faces growing difficulties when the 
technological gap decreases and the barriers for importing technologies are higher, 
particularly in those of dual use. In order to keep following a route of technological 
catch-up and preserve national autonomy, developing countries face the necessity to 
create a new industrial policy centered on the development of indigenous technologies 
exploited by competitive domestic companies in high-tech activities.
Liberalization and high trade growth took place in the world economy in the last 
three decades before the 2008 great crisis. In this period, the US and other “head-
quarter” countries organized deep global value chains (GVC) through transnational 
corporations (TNC) encompassing vast populations occupied in low wage countries, 
in productive stages in which wages were an important competitive edge. GVC led by 
TNC have reshaped the world division of labor. The emergence of vertical production 
networks was possible due to the progress of information and communications tech-
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nologies, as well as by economic liberalization in developing countries. Participating 
in this web led by TNC was considered, in many countries, the new industrial policy.
Since 2008, lower rates of GDP and international trade growth prevailed, and, 
despite the predominance of liberal thought and systematic opposition to industrial 
policy as a development lever, industrial policy has been “back in”. In the US, Ger-
many, France, Japan, and South Korea it never ceased to be a strong lever; in China, 
industrial policy achieved a high importance since the last decade. The diffusion of 
new technologies, particularly information and communication technologies (ICT) 
and their huge impact on cyber-physical industrial systems, as well as in new genera-
tions of weapons and war tactics, create systematic challenges for national power.
Electronic equipment (including electrical machines) and ICT, the greatest drivers 
for high-tech industrial production, have a common feature: they depend crucially on 
semiconductors, a high-tech input that demands complex process equipment for its 
production. Electronic devices, smartphones and computers – the most demanded 
downstream final goods – have to a substantial extent their differentiation based on the 
capacity and reliability of semiconductors they contain inside, and the same happens 
with weapons and defense sensor systems. Modern technological superiority depends 
heavily on ICT. The capital goods necessary to produce and process high-powered 
semiconductors are the highest high-tech upstream stage of modern technology. Few 
countries dominate this technology and few companies produce high performance 
semiconductors. The interactions among semiconductor manufacturing equipment 
suppliers, semiconductor producers and its users (electronics and ICT) form a crucial 
base for successful innovation in modern technologies.
China is nowadays a major producer of electronic, ICT products, and the great-
est importer of integrated circuits (IC), expressing its success in the fabrication of 
these final goods (in stages distant from innovation and in which mature technologies 
predominate) and simultaneously its technological backwardness and distance from 
state-of-the-art semiconductor technology. The Chinese government considers this 
technological gap an economic and national security threat.
This paper examines the Chinese degree of backwardness in semiconductors and 
China’s perception of its implications for technological development and for national 
security, as well as the industrial policies in semiconductors aimed to reduce it by 
developing indigenous innovation and evolving in the industry’s productive chain. 
In addition to this introduction, this paper contains other five sections. The second 
section reviews the Chinese interpretation of the “revolution in military affairs”, its 
reliance on semiconductors of high performance, the predominance of the US semi-
conductor transnational and the security threats associated to IC. The third section 
examines some new directions in the modern manufacturing system stimulated by 
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ICT, highlighting the importance of the productive system’s integration for productive 
efficiency and the Chinese analysis of its backwardness. The fourth section considers 
the global semiconductor industry, China’s position and the US leadership based on 
security concerns. The fifth section regards China’s backwardness and high import-
dependence, and some efforts to promote import substitution, create domestic lead-
ers, investment funds and other policies aimed to acquire technology. The sixth sec-
tion concludes the paper.
2. SEMICONDUCTORS AND CONTEMPORARY WARFARE
Semiconductors are vital for modern warfare in multiple fronts, ranging from modern 
weapons and battlefield operations to cybersecurity. As ICT has been driving the revo-
lution in military affairs, chips became a building block of defense capability, being 
the foundation of modern systems of battle management, weapons, navigation, com-
munication and space, deemed in modern military affairs as force multipliers (CHU, 
2013). Whereas possessing leading-edge semiconductors not available to rivals can 
entail military-edge (PCAST, 2017), guaranteeing semiconductors’ integrity is essen-
tial for the proper operations of modern weapons and those systems dependent on in-
formation that sustain national defense (CHU, 2013), including to prevent foes’ access 
and control. Therefore, in semiconductors, detaining technological lead, preserving 
integrity and guaranteeing supply availability are national security concerns. As China 
is far from the state-of-the-art semiconductor technology and depends heavily on IC 
imports, all these aspects are paramount to the country.
In preparing for “local wars under conditions of informatization”, the People’s Lib-
eration Army (PLA) devised a military strategy based on the concept of asymmetrical 
warfare, which mobilizes means beyond those narrowly deemed military to prompt 
attacks and defeat technologically superior adversaries, particularly through informa-
tion warfare (RAUD, 2016; CHU, 2013). China has a broad and singular approach 
to information warfare, fusing into a single discipline the two aspects of ICT-related 
warfare, developed apart in the US1, namely, electronic and cyber warfare (DICKSON, 
2017), focused respectively on electronic equipment and data; while extending beyond 
ICT to encompass “human information processing and cognitive space” (RAUD, 2016, 
p. 10). In ICT-related warfare, semiconductors are of utmost importance. They are also 
1 “In the U.S. military, electronic warfare and cyber capabilities live in different military domains, deliv-
ered by operators who exist in different military units and who largely grew up in different career fields” 
(DICKSON, 2017).
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a target of Chinese ‘Assassin’s Mace weapons’, which seek to neutralize technological 
superiority and defeat adversaries in asymmetrical warfare by attacking their greatest 
vulnerabilities (PILLSBURY, 2001). Hence, semiconductors are a key in its military 
modernization and strategy, be it to overcome or to offset its technological inferiority, 
in conventional or asymmetrical warfare.
Semiconductors underpin what was assessed in China’s 2015 white paper on mili-
tary strategy as the “new stage” of the world revolution in military affairs, encom-
passing: (i) the sophistication of “long-range, precise, smart, stealthy, and unmanned 
weapons”; (ii) the affirmation of cyber-space and outer space as the “new command-
ing heights in strategic competition”; (iii) the rapid evolution of the war form “to infor-
mationization”; and (iv) the military restructuring pursued by world powers, both in 
its material and ideal dimensions (STATE COUNCIL, 2015a). In 2015, by the creation 
of a new military branch, the Strategic Support Force, China demonstrated “the wea-
ponization of broad information capabilities, plus the weaponization of outer space”, 
moving beyond its Assassin’s Mace program towards “fifth-generation warfare con-
cepts” (FISHER apud PHILIPP, 2017).
Furthermore, the core of contemporary hard military power, precision-guided 
weapons2, has its accuracy and reliability – and arguably feasibility – contingent on 
semiconductor technology (CHU, 2013). Semiconductor technological lead can con-
substantiate superiority not only in precision force, but also in electronic warfare 
(EW), which involves “the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the 
electromagnetic spectrum or attack the enemy” (DoD, 2017, p. 80). Leading-edge 
semiconductors’ usage in EW entails jamming communications and radars, compro-
mising command and control and improving stealth.
For instance, in 2016, the Department of Advanced Research Project Agency 
(DARPA) announced a new chip (an analog to digital converter) funded by the agency 
and developed in partnership with the US firm Global Foundries, described as having 
“a processing speed nearly ten times that of commercially available, state-of-the-art 
alternatives” (DARPA, 2016). Such technological advantage would provide anti-jam-
ming capabilities to overcome threats as seen in the conflict in Ukraine, where the 
separatists employed EW against drones and communications “seriously hindering 
battlefield operations for their opponent” (GIBBONS-NEFF, 2016)3.
2 Includes “cruise missiles, ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missiles], and submarine-launched missiles” 
(CHU, 2013, p. 39).
3 DARPA stresses that semiconductor technology advancements enabled “three major systems” under de-
velopment across the electromagnetic spectrum: the Navy’s “Next Generation Jammer”, to deceive radars 
and protect assets; the “Air and Missile Defense Radar”, to search and track ballistic missiles; and the 
“Space Fence”, augmenting small orbiting objects’ detection (DARPA, 2015).
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Whilst jamming blocks the functioning of devices, directed-energy weapons can 
destroy semiconductors necessary for electronics’ operation. These weapons seek to 
emulate the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) accompanying a nuclear explosion, which 
can irreversibly destroy semiconductors without being “generally meant to kill peo-
ple” (SCHIESEL, 2003). Even if military and space chips are protected from nuclear 
EMP through radiation-hardening, developments in directed-energy weapons oper-
ating in diverse ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum may render them vulnerable. 
Furthermore, as most semiconductors used in a country are not radiation-hardened, 
“EMP strikes may ‘deafen’ and ‘blind’ an entire country” (CHU, 2013, p. 44). In 2017, 
China reported a breakthrough in directed-energy weapons: a high-power microwave 
weapon that can destruct electronics by compromising IC, for instance, in tanks, mis-
siles or satellites; an Assassin’s Mace that granted the researcher behind it a first prize 
National Science and Technology Progress Award (KANIA, 2017).
EMP strikes are not the only semiconductor-level threat. Inserting Trojan horses 
in IC during design or fabrication can compromise not only weapons’ proper opera-
tion through performance restrictions and a diverse array of programmable failures, 
as kill switches, but also cybersecurity by providing a back door to outsiders bypassing 
all higher security levels. According to Schwartau (apud CHU, 2013), hypothetically, 
malicious circuitry could be inserted in military systems sold to US customers by the 
CIA/Pentagon, for instance, to trigger failure in a predetermined timeframe, to devi-
ate course or even to self-destroy after used4. IC’s Trojans can also target consumer 
electronics and critical infrastructure.
Security threats associated to IC have been the focus of a growing US concern, as 
the US production and the global industry have been moving to China. Previously, 
the industry’s globalization occurred mainly among military allies, since the major 
global players are Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Europe, besides the US. The US 
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in 2011, launched the Trusted IC 
program (IARPA, 2011) to minimize the risks associated to foreign manufactured IC. 
According to the Senate Committee on the US Military Forces (CAS, 2011), an inves-
tigation on counterfeit electronic parts in parcel of the supply chain of the Department 
of Defense found 1.800 suspected cases, wherefrom a sample was tracked, 70% leading 
to China. Apparently, counterfeits generally come from e-waste5.
4 In 2017, in the aftermath of Xi Jinping’s visit to the US during rising tensions with North Korea, the lat-
ter’s failed missile test has prompted strong speculations on possible US sabotage (SANGER and BROAD, 
2017).
5 “In an illustrative case, used and remarked semiconductors were sold as new by a Chinese firm, and they 
were installed in unfreeze modules of a reconnaissance airship. The problem was detected during a flight 
test” (ITA, 2016, p.27)
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While the US have security concerns on imported semiconductors from China, 
even if the latter produces just a small share of global sales; the US semiconductor 
giants’ (Intel and Qualcomm, along with the late IBM semiconductor division and Ap-
ple’s recently expanding one) have been directly implicated in the Global Surveillance 
Program PRISM, unveiled by Edward Snowden. China, heavily reliant on imports, 
mostly from the US and Japan, has a major vulnerability that the CCP set to tackle 
through ambitious industrial policies.
3. SEMICONDUCTORS AND MANUFACTURING MODERNIZATION
It [the role of the IC industry] is similar to the role that the steel industry played in 
supporting China’s earlier economic development […] We are now in the informa-
tion era […] If China is unable to develop its IC industry, then the national goal of 
transforming our development model and industry structure will face a litany of 
problems. (YE TIANCHUN, 2014, p. 2)
As high-tech building blocks of ICT products, semiconductors are fundamental for 
downstream competitiveness in ICT, but also beyond. According to China’s Minister of 
Industry and Information Technology, Miao Wei: “the scale and level of a country’s IC 
development has become an important measurement of a country’s national competi-
tiveness and overall strength” (2014, p. 1). If semiconductors are at the ICT industry’s 
heart, their economic importance become even more critical when informatization of 
manufacturing and associated services is deemed by planners as the key to their overall 
manufacturing (and economic) upgrade strategy, ultimately aimed at becoming the 
world’s manufacturing leader by mid-century. The first step to this strategic goal was 
launched in 2015, the ‘Made in China 2025’ (MIC, 2025) plan or ‘Manufacturing 2025’.
The plan characterizes that “the deep integration of next generation IT into manu-
facturing is triggering far-reaching industrial transformation”, a process that would 
involve an industrial revolution, for “intelligent manufacturing, such as intelligent 
equipment and plants based on cyber-physical systems [CPS], is creating a new manu-
facture revolution” (STATE COUNCIL, 2015, p. 3). In this spirit, the plan focuses on 
raising China’s capacity in innovation, industrial quality and performance, while hav-
ing “the integration of the next-generation IT into manufacturing the main thread, in-
telligent manufacturing the main priority” and setting targets for industrial broadband 
penetration, digital R&D and design tool penetration and key process control rate. 
Therefore, semiconductors constitute a building block for China’s new comprehensive 
manufacturing strategy.
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Implementing sensors and IC on objects enable them, respectively, to perceive the 
environment, generating constant data status and position, and to compute and com-
municate the latter through the internet, promoting the digitalization and networking 
of the physical elements in the Internet of Things (IoT). The information flow gener-
ated by the diffusion of the IoT requires network and communication infrastructure 
as well as big data analytics, imposing the necessity for cloud computing. Also relying 
on semiconductors for the sensing, computing and connecting – despite networking 
not necessarily occurring through the Internet –, CPS encompass a virtual counterpart 
of machines and objects to simulate the operations of physical elements. Instead of 
merely monitoring objects through sensors, CPS have further emphasis on control, 
acting upon the environment, being especially used in critical infrastructure: “CPSs 
perform automated or partially automated control of physical equipment in manufac-
turing and chemical plants, electric utilities, distribution and transportation systems 
and many other industries” (COLBERT, 2017, p. 41)
Both CPS and the IoT are at the core of what has been proclaimed as the fourth 
industrial revolution, such as proposed by the Working Group of Germany’s govern-
mental “strategic initiative” Industrie 4.0 (KAGERMAN et al., 2013). Whether a fourth 
industrial revolution is on course is beyond our scope6. Of utmost importance is that 
the concept is being instrumentally mobilized by major states in the pursuit of com-
prehensive industrial policies to defend or, in China’s case, to subvert the hierarchical 
status quo in global manufacturing production and value appropriation in a context 
of increased global competition. Undoubtedly, the widespread integration of ICT into 
manufacturing and associate services, especially by the digitalization of physical ele-
ments, is at those projects’ core, extending the revolutionary effects of ICT on produc-
tion further than already experienced over the last decades.
The current stream of modernization in manufacturing and associate services is 
characterized by the diffusion of information systems and the incorporation of pro-
ductive organizational strategies enabled by ICT technologies. The central question 
for productive efficiency appears as its increasing dependence on the productive sys-
tem’s integration. “Smart” factories, cities and grid are enabled by semiconductors’ im-
plementation over physical structures, increasing their efficiency, yet exposing critical 
civilian infrastructure to remote cyber threats.
Over the last years, China has become the world’s major consumption market for 
semiconductors, particularly for IC, in consonance with its consolidation as the main 
electronics’ producer and exporter, largely resulting from typical vertical specializa-
tion in CGV led/integrated by foreign TNCs. Nevertheless, semiconductor local pro-
6 For a critical perspective on the fourth industrial revolution’s discourse, see Pfeiffer (2017). 
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duction and Chinese technological capabilities in IC still lag significantly behind its 
consumption and the technological frontier, creating obstacles for the development 
of Chinese-based high-end ICT goods. The lack of integration and complementarity 
of China’s manufacturing structure has its ultimate manifestation in the enormous IC 
domestic production-consumption gap met by imports. For these reasons, IC became 
China’s main net import, surpassing crude oil. Considering the increased demands 
posed by the manufacturing upgrade strategy of the world’s factory over IC’s provi-
sion, China’s position as the main semiconductor consumer is prone to strengthen. 
Addressing these shortfalls in terms of production and technology is an emergency 
task for the CCP to assure the overall success of its manufacturing and economic strat-
egy, as well as the security of intelligent factories, cities and grid.
IC, therefore, are a crucial element in the MIC’s “Four Foundations” or fundamen-
tal industrial capabilities, one of them being “essential spare parts and components”, 
whose “weak industry foundation […] restrains Chinese manufacturing innovation 
and quality improvement” (STATE COUNCIL, 2015, p. 16). In these parts and in ad-
vanced materials, MIC 2025 pursues increasing the domestic sourcing to 40% by 2020 
and 70% by 2025. Not by chance, when assessing the need for achieving “breakthrough 
in major areas”, the first sector that appears on MIC 2025 is “integrated circuits and 
special equipment” in the area of “next generation IT”. Pursuing improvements that go 
from design and intellectual property in design tools to mastering advanced packag-
ing and cultivating key manufacturing equipment providers, the plan seeks to achieve 
“breakthroughs in core chips that are related to national information and network 
security and complete electronic machine development to improve the adoption of 
domestic chips” (STATE COUNCIL, 2015, p. 22). Notwithstanding, MIC 2025 is not 
China’s only policy for IC, as discussed in section 5.
4. THE GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY AND THE CHINESE POSITION7
The semiconductor industry8 is one of the world’s most capital-intensive, with high 
R&D expenditures and fast technological progress9. The extraordinary decline in 
computer prices is greatly explained by the collapse of semiconductors’ prices with 
simultaneous capacity improvement. This achievement was strongly based on tech-
7 This section is partially based on Majerowicz (2015).
8 Semiconductor devices represented a U$ 339 billion market in 2016 (SIA, 2017).
9 An IC state-of-the-art manufacturing facility (fab) costed between U$5 to 10 billion in 2016 (SIA, 2016a); 
whereas the global industry-wide ratio of R&D expenditures to sales averaged 16% in the 2000-2014 
period (ICINSIGHTS, 2016).
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nical progress in machines used in semiconductors’ production. Thus, the modern 
industrial system is formed by three high-tech sectors, semiconductors, machines 
at upstream and computers (and other users, as smartphones and industrial control 
systems) at downstream, with military demand for specific achievements in weapons 
performance and features largely contributing to its rise while exerting pressure over 
and supporting the system for technological progress, particularly through mission-
oriented projects. This system is split into different segments and stages according to 
the scale, financial and technological barriers. In this system, only the US, Japan and 
Germany headed all of its sectors and, therefore, are the ICT integrators. Notwith-
standing, when military demand is accounted for, the US appear as the single full ICT 
integrator.
Whereas China is having great success in developing the downstream high-tech 
sector, the control over the pace of technological progress in the modern industrial 
system is strongly dependent on semiconductors and machines at upstream. This is 
highlighted by Ye Tianchun: “China has vigorously developed its IT industry, but we 
still import huge amounts of chips and equipment from abroad, and the pulse of de-
velopment is in the hands of other people” (2014, p. 2). The few countries that con-
trol technological progress and integrate the modern industrial system contrast with 
the diversity of those involved in semiconductor production, many being mere sites 
for TNC’s operations. Currently highly fragmented, the semiconductor industry was 
one of the first to become global. The large variety of semiconductors components is 
subsumed in two industrial segments: IC and optoelectronics-sensor-discrete devices. 
Integrated circuits or chips, the “brains” of electronics, form the bulk of the semicon-
ductor market.
The IC value chain is divided in five stages: conception; design; the front-end of 
fabrication or merely fabrication; assembly, packaging and testing (AP&T), the back-
end of fabrication; and customer services (GUTIERREZ and LEAL, 2004). Concep-
tion and design are skilled labor-intensive. Initially executed manually, they started 
being performed using IC’s project software, the electronic design automation (EDA) 
tools, in the early 1980s.
Fabrication is characterized by the intense usage of machinery. Front-end plants 
(fabs) impose very high capital requirements – involving manufacturing operations 
among the world’s most complexes – and “constant facility improvement to keep up 
with technological advances”, while “successful manufacturers require high capacity 
utilization (90 percent) and large-scale operations” (SIA, 2016a, p. 5).
Finally, AP&T, the simplest productive phase, is unskilled labor-intensive, “al-
though still relatively technologically sophisticated” (GAO, 2006, p. 4). According to 
Gartner, in the global industry only 6% of workers employed in the back-end had 
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engineering diplomas, contrasting to 24% in fabrication and 85% of higher educated 
workers in design (WANG and WANG apud MAYS, 2013). Despite automation in 
AP&T and advanced packaging technologies, fabrication’s high sophistication degree 
makes back-end machinery look relatively cheap.
Originally, all enterprises were integrated device manufacturers (IDM), compris-
ing the entire productive process. IDM remain important contemporarily, and the 
industry’s leaders, Intel and Samsung, are both IDM. The IC industry’s strategic sta-
tus informed its delocalization process, which, roughly, preserved in the headquarter 
economies the higher value-added stages associated to technological development and 
control, and the fabrication of products in the technological frontier. The fragmenta-
tion of the IC value chain started with AP&T delocalization to Asia. In the wake of 
this intra-firm offshoring process, a new enterprise type emerged, the semiconductor 
assembly and test services (SATS), commercializing their productive capacity and en-
abling back-end activities’ outsourcing.
The most significant value chain fragmentation, revolutionizing the industry’s en-
trepreneurial organization, occurred only with the advent of EDA tools. They enabled 
fabrication’s detachment from design, affirmed by the emergence of fabless – firms 
without fabs and AP&T plants –, pure-play foundries – enterprises detaining fabs that 
commercialize their productive capacity to others – and design houses (MILLARD et 
al., 2012).
Considerations for relocating front-end are distinct from back-end. In fabs, labor 
is just 5% to 10% of total costs (SYKES and YINUG, 2006). Front-end offshoring 
tends to occur in less sophisticated ICs, maintaining home those plants with the lat-
est process technologies and most sophisticated products, while in AP&T offshoring 
generalizes despite the product. IDMs’ recalcitrance to offshore the most advanced 
fabs, sometimes limited/prohibited by governments, can be related to fabrication’s 
importance to innovation and to technological learning in IC. Regarding the design 
segment and R&D, whereas delocalization may respond to talent availability and to 
cheaper skilled labor, the proximity to consumers is an important parameter, enabling 
to better respond to client specifications and adapt products to particular markets. 
R&D labs holding fabs that run new process technologies, however, are prone to re-
main home.
To integrate in this GVC beyond assembly, a latecomer must count with domestic 
efforts to develop fabrication as well as significant talents and skilled laborers avail-
ability to carry on design, whereas having a sizeable domestic market may open in-
tegration roads unavailable to small economies. Initially assembly sites, some Asian 
economies, notably South Korea and Taiwan, managed to move-up in the value chain, 
whilst others, such as Malaysia, have not. China’s main roles to the global industry 
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contemporarily are of prime consumer and assembler of ICs, with foreign firms’ pre-
dominating in both supply to and production in China.
Although global, the semiconductor industry is controlled by a handful of mili-
tary allied economies. The role of military requirements and support were particularly 
important to the industry’s rise and geographical dispersion. Industrial policy and 
strategic trade were fundamental for its birth in the US and the subsequent entrance 
of the major world market players. They were also paramount to defend industrial 
leadership in periods of increased international competition. In the semiconductor 
industry’s evolution, governmental support has been decisive.
Despite US commercial firms inventing the transistor in 1947, and the IC, proto-
typed in 1958 (Texas Instruments) and produced for commercialization in 1961 (Fair-
child) (MILLARD et al., 2012), the US governmental support, particularly from the 
military, was vital for the industry creation. The government provided the essential 
parameters for the rise of semiconductor supply and demand. It posited and prioritized 
a technological necessity, funded initial R&D and the first pilot production, assisted 
R&D and production engineering, and assured military procurement at lucrative 
prices (NRC, 2012; RASIAH, 2010; MORRIS, 1990). Initially, R&D came to serve the 
need for radar precision in the Second World War against Germany, funded mainly by 
the US Signal Corps, whereas public funding extended beyond to encompass 40%-45% 
of the US industry R&D from late 1950s to early 1970s (NRC, 2012; RASIAH, 2010).
Morris (1990) points the assured military market as “perhaps the most crucial 
factor in the development of the industry” (p. 73). Guaranteeing demand at lucrative 
prices stimulated private firms’ pursuit of IC development and provided the market for 
semiconductors that industrial and commercial consumers could not at stages of high 
unit costs, while giving enough demand extent for generating productive economies 
of scale in the 1960s, necessary to reduce prices and boost industrial/commercial de-
mand (MORRIS, 1990; NRC, 2012). Such advantage was unavailable to firms in other 
countries, which also suffered from their governments’ “comparatively little support” 
(MORRIS, 1990, p. 73).
However, the US would face challenges from Japan. Successful industrial policies 
allied to the unilateral openness of the US market to Japan, extending to the Japanese 
the conditions for productive economies of scale, led Japan to the industry’s leadership 
in the 1980s. The US share of worldwide semiconductor market declined from 60%, 
in the early 1970s, to 51% in 1982, and 35% in 1989. At the same time, Japan’s rose re-
spectively from 15% to 35% and to 51% (JOHNSON, 1991). First felt by the late 1950s, 
in the form of consumer electronics’ imports, Japan’s competition prompted US semi-
conductor firms’ response by offshoring assembling to low wage countries in the early 
1960s (MORRIS, 1990), especially to Asia, kick-starting the formation of the GVC.
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Counting with long-term bank loans at low interest rates, a protected market and 
a well-funded research consortium led by the government, Japanese firms developed 
as IDM (NRC, 2012; BINGHAM, 1998). Japan entered and dominated the leading-
edge memory market, in which low technological cumulativeness due to “technologi-
cal discontinuities between generations” and mass production made it more prone to 
technological catch-up10 (CHANG et al., 2015, p. 27), whereas the latter feature made 
this segment a driver for process technology in the industry (NRC, 2012). Generally 
in a same keiretsu, semiconductor firms close ties with semiconductor manufacturing 
equipment (SME) suppliers were crucial for building a strong SME industry, which be-
came the world leader. Differently, US semiconductor firms constantly changed sup-
pliers and transferred the costs of demand volatility to the latter (BINGHAM, 1998).
The US semiconductor industry called for government support through the lob-
bying and public relations of the Semiconductor Industry Association (BINGHAM, 
1998). Meanwhile “a defense task force warned, in 1987, that a dependence on foreign 
suppliers for state-of-the-art chips for weapons was an ‘unacceptable situation’ because 
it would undermine the U.S. military strategy of maintaining technological superi-
ority” (NRC, 2012, p. 325). As a result, the US created SEMATECH, a government-
industry R&D consortium, half-funded by DARPA and involving major US firms. By 
a legislative rule, excepting “precompetitive” research from anti-trust laws (BING-
HAM, 1998), SEMATECH developed an industry-wide detailed coordinating tech-
nological roadmap for accelerating the adoption of new technologies. Moreover, the 
US pushed Japan to open its market through the bilateral first Semiconductor Trade 
Agreement (1986-1991), also aimed to ban and monitor Japanese “dumping practices” 
(OTA, 1991). US firms were targeted to climb from 9% to 20% of Japan’s domestic 
market (JOHNSON, 1991), while the US declared that “dumping practices” continued 
in 1987, imposing sanctions that were followed by Japan reducing dynamic random 
access memory (DRAM) production and prices increasing (OTA, 1991).
By the early 1990s, the US was able to regain leadership, though not without costs. 
Many of its large firms had exited the DRAM market, maintaining just Micron as a top 
player, and losing its commercial firms in the critical/highest technological SME, the 
photolithography tools, whose persistent improvements enabled IC manufacturers to 
decrease chips’ size, while augmenting their performance and functionalities (ATTA 
and SLUSARCZUK, 2012).
Nevertheless, the US actively enabled the conditions for the emergence of compet-
itors to Japan. By handling the Japanese government and repressing its semiconductor 
10 Contrasting to high cumulativeness and small-batched production in logic favoring Intel dominance 
(CHANG et al., 2015).
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industry, a space was created for the ascertaining of South Korean chaebols in memory 
chips, with Samsung becoming the segments’ dominant enterprise. To counter Can-
non and Nikon, the US government allowed US firms’ acquisition by and partner-
ship with Dutch ASML, transferring to the latter the most advanced photolithography 
technologies and providing access to US national defense laboratories (ATTA and 
SLUSARCZUK, 2012). ASML became the segment’s world leading enterprise, while 
providing early access to the newest photolithography tools to US firms11. Current 
progresses in photolithography tools by ASML are still contingent on US governmen-
tal labs’ developed technology. Although the US lost its commercial leg, they can still 
operate as system integrators insofar as they dictate technological change in such cru-
cial equipment.
Starting in the mid-1960s, Korea and Taiwan became sites for TNC semiconduc-
tor assembling, particularly US’, supported by policies to attract FDI and to increase 
exports (OTA, 1991). Whereas during the 1970s industrial policies aimed to foster 
an indigenous semiconductor industry in Korea, they more importantly gave rise to 
the economically concentrated and dominant chaebols in electronics. The latter would 
target entering in the DRAM market in the 1980s, to which scale and vast financial 
resources were imperative (KIM, 1996).
To escape DRAM’s intense competition, Taiwanese industrial policy targeted cus-
tomized chips to which design capabilities were essential (OTA, 1991). The main strat-
egy of Taiwan was to establish the public Electronic Research and Service Organiza-
tion (ERSO), which would partner with foreign firms to acquire technology, and help 
create private domestic firms which would receive technology from ERSO. The Radio 
Corporation of America partnership with ERSO was cornerstone to the creation of the 
United Microelectronics Corporation, and the subsequent partnership with Philips to 
TSMC.
While SATS had already emerged in Taiwan, allowing TNC to externalize assem-
bling, TSMC, created in 1987, was the first foundry fully commercializing its produc-
tive capacity, without developing/selling their own IC. Such foundries’ consolidation 
enabled fabless’ proliferation, which could then enter the industry circumventing the 
entry costs of fabs. Moreover, to deal with excess demand and particular lines of inte-
grated circuits, IDM started to outsource to foundries (GAO, 2006).
11 “Manufacturers, however, can make only one or two leading-edge tools per month. The highest profit 
margins for IC products come immediately after an advance occurs in lithography technology. Once the 
improved lithography tools become more widely available, the ICs they produce become commodity 
items with thin margins. […] Tool suppliers use this as leverage to reward their largest and most loyal 
customers” (ATTA and SLUSARKZUC, 2012).
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In 2016, among the forecasted top-20 semiconductor firms in sales revenues, the US 
held eight enterprises, including world leader Intel; Japan, Europe and Taiwan had three 
each (TSMC as 3rd); Korea had two (Samsung as 2nd); and Singapore had one; whereas 
12 firms were IDM, five fabless and three foundries (ICINSIGHTS, 2016c). While China 
held no position, especially for lacking a large IDM, it became the main semiconductor 
consumption market, representing 60.6% of the global market12 in 2016 (PWC, 2017a), 
and the major semiconductor assembly base, the lowest value-added stage. These facts 
emanate from China’s capacity to attract FDI in the unskilled labor-intensive assembling 
of both electronics and semiconductors. However, since mid-2000s, China has had do-
mestic firms among the top 10 of each GVC’s segment (fabless, foundries and SATS).
Figure 1 – Market shares of global semiconductor sales of final 







2013 2014 2015 2016
51% 50% 48%51%
16% 17% 17% 17%
14% 12% 11% 11%
9% 8% 9% 10%
6% 7% 6% 7%
4% 4% 4% 5%
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on data extracted from SIA 
(2014, 2016, 2017) and ITA (2016).
In 2016, considering only the sales of final semiconductor devices (fabless/IDM) 
Chinese headquartered firms held a mere 5% of the world semiconductor market 
(SIA, 2017). Although responsive when their leadership was threatened, the US largely 
condescended to Japan’s and later Korea’s and Taiwan’s industrial policies – counting 
with US market unilateral openness and technological transfer – for their geopolitical 
alliance and role as bases for US military containment of Chinese influence on the 
region. Since 1989, the US has kept export controls to China. The Wassenaar Arrange-
ment has served the US practice of limiting SME exports to China at least at two gen-
erations behind US state-of-the-art (GAO, 2002; LI, 2016). Taiwan has severely lim-
ited the scope of semiconductor Taiwanese companies’ and citizens’ activities in the 
mainland13, focusing until recently in prohibitions to outward investments, especially 
12 Estimates based on Chinese statistics, different form international standards, see PwC (2016).
13 See Chu (2013).
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in design and manufacturing. Nonetheless, due to the mainland’s market importance, 
Taiwan increasingly relaxed restrictions; while global competition has made US export 
controls circumvented by acquisition from Europe and Japan (MAYS, 2013).
China’s ambition to have a world-class semiconductor industry and the vast funds 
and multiple tools being mobilized for it represent an economic and military threat to 
the US and the major players. If China acquires a dominant market share, US commer-
cial threats are unlikely to be effective in disarming its industrial policy and repressing 
its industry, as China is the largest semiconductor market and the US its largest  supplier.
5. CHINESE IC INDUSTRIAL POLICY
China had an auto-sufficient but technologically backward semiconductor industry, 
granted strategic status in the Maoist period, with the creation of the Electronic Indus-
try Ministry (RASIAH et al., 2008). The country pursued, until 1980, the autonomous 
development of semiconductor technology for military use, developing its first semicon-
ductor in 1956 and its first IC in 1964, with R&D undertook by state labs and IC manu-
facturing by state-owned factories (LI, 2016). When reform and opening took place, 
China was far behind the international semiconductor mainstream: “Being backward 
and incompatible with the mainstream standard, the indigenously developed technology 
was gradually abandoned” (LI, 2016, p. 196). In regards to manufacturing process tech-
nology, China was five generations behind the US state-of-the-art in 1986 (GAO, 2002).
Through the 1980s and 1990s, China tried a series of policies to develop the semi-
conductor industry, including importing entire production lines by state-owned en-
terprises (SOE). As the Chinese consumption market for semiconductors started to 
grow beyond its productive capabilities, triggering TNC’s interests, the CCP allowed 
their entrance through joint-ventures with SOE (LI, 2016). In 1989, China produced 
114 million IC units and consumed 300 to 400 million; in 1995, this gap was of 4.5 bil-
lion units, representing U$ 1.7 billion (SIMON 1992 apud LI, 2016; SIMON,1996 apud 
LI, 2016). In this context, China launched Project 909, which included the attempt to 
build as an IDM a new indigenous firm Shanghai Hua Hong Group in joint-venture 
with Japanese NEC in 1997, a frustrated attempt as the firm failed to become an IDM 
and established as a foundry (LI, 2016).
It was only in the 2000s that China would become deeply integrated into the semi-
conductor GVC, in the context of its World Trade Organization accession. Successive 
industrial policies have been implemented since 2000, with varying degrees of success 
over each GVC segment. Overall, these policies contributed to increase China’s par-
ticipation in the semiconductor industry’s revenues from 2% to 17.8% of the global 
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industry from 2000 to 2016 (Figure 2). Such a significant participation in the global in-
dustry, compared to the mere 5% held in 2016 by China-based firms in the world sales 
of final devices, on the one hand, reveals the importance of foreign firms in China’s 
semiconductor production; one the other hand, it accounts for the contribution of 
SATS and foundries for the overall industry revenues.
The inaugural policy landmark was the 2000 State Council Rule 18, which fos-
tered the entrance of foreign-owned semiconductor firms, reduced SOE’ role and pro-
vided tax incentives (ERNST, 2015). The Rule promoted favorable tax treatment to 
IC domestic firms, considered as those located in China, encompassing foreign firms 
(PWC, 2004), as well as government investment in R&D, education and infrastructure 
(CS, 2016).
Chinese low unskilled labor costs acted as a strong magnet to global electronics’ 
manufacturers and semiconductor AP&T, the latter also attracted by electronics pro-
ducers’ proximity. Both productive migration trends carried uninterruptedly through-
out the 2010s. In 2009, China became the world’s main base for semiconductor AP&T 
in factory floor space, ranking first in the 2010s also in facilities, production value and 
employees (PWC, 2017, 2017a). All main IDM and SATS have AP&T plants in the 
mainland. In 2017, China had three firms among the top 10 SATS worldwide: Jiangsu 
Changjiang Electronics Technology (4th), Tianshui Huatian Microelectronics (7th) and 
Tongfu Microelectronics (8th) (PWC, 2017a). Therefore, the segment is a mature in-
dustry in China with globally competitive domestic firms in outsourced services.
Figure 2 – The Semiconductor Industry in China (2000/2016)
Semicondutor revenues (U$ bn)
aAs world share
OSD revenues (U$ bn)
IC revenues (U$ bn)
Semi AT&T (% of world
production value)
Semi fab (% world fab capacity)
IC desing revenues (U$ bn)
self-sufficiency ratio
self-sufficiency ratio
as % world fabless
2000 2003 2005 2007 2009 b2011 2013
5 8.3 16.1 27.4 29.2 51.4 65.8
2% 5% 6% 9% 7.5% 9% 12%
2.8 4 7.5 11 12.9 21.5 25
- - - - - 106% 110%
2.2 4.2 8.6 16.5 16.2 29.9 40.8
19% 17% 19% 22% 19% 24% 27%
- 9% 12.6% 15% 20.3% 30.8% 40.8%
- 6.3% 7.4% 8.7% 9.6% 10.8% 10.9%
0.13 0.54 1.52 2.97 3.95 8.14 13.15























Notes: (1) Overscript (a) represents a series break in 2009 and (b) represents series breaks due to revised 
industry statistics. (2) Semi stands for semiconductors; OSD, for opto-sensor-discrete; IC, for integrated 
circuits; AP&T, for assembly, packaging and test. (3) Semiconductors is the aggregate of the OSD and IC 
segments. (4) Self-sufficiency ratio is the ratio of production over consumption in China. (5) All data in-
clude both foreign and domestic firms. (6) IC design revenues for 2016 were obtained from PwC (2017a) 
by multiplying the percentage of design revenues in overall industry revenues, while the percentage over 
world fabless revenues was obtained dividing PwC data by ICinsights (2017) worldwide fabless revenues.
Source: PwC (2004, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2017a), ICinsights (2017)
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In the early 2000s, the 10th Five Year Plan prioritized developing a domestic IC 
foundry industry: “pure-play foundries SMIC and Grace (now Hua Hong Semicon-
ductor) were both founded in 2000 and XMC was founded in 2006” (ICINSIGHTS, 
2016a). Including the opto-sensor-discrete segment, China’s share of world semicon-
ductor fab capacity grew from 1.5% in 2001 to 7.4% in 2005 (PWC, 2016). During 
the period, few foreign IDM had fabs in China (PWC, 2006), and IC fabrication was 
mainly propelled by governmental efforts in creating domestic foundries.
However, Chinese headquartered firms’ share of the pure-play world foundry 
market peaked in 2006-2007 in 13.3% and dropped, stagnating around 8-9% in the 
2010s, despite support since the 1990s (ICINSIGHTS, 2016b; CS, 2016). Chinese lead-
ing foundry SMIC has been for the last years consistently two generations behind the 
leading-edge (ERNST, 2015). The main challenges to Chinese firms’ rapid entry would 
be the high capital requirements and technological gap, acquiring/guaranteeing cus-
tomers to newly created capacity and developing across the IC ecosystem for imple-
menting new process technologies each two years (CS, 2016).
In the early 2000s, the design sector also started to develop, becoming the major 
Chinese IC segment in revenues in 2016 (PWC, 2017a). The government stimulated the 
emergence of fabless to create demand for homegrown foundries. Even if most of cur-
rent top domestic fabless were created in the 2001-2004 period (ICINSIGHTS, 2016a), 
foreign firms then preponderated in China’s design sector, aiming to adapt products to 
the growing domestic market (PWC, 2004). China’s fabless sector, particularly home-
grown firms, has bloomed since 200514. As China became the main semiconductor 
consumption market in 2005 (PWC, 2006) and has geared into becoming the largest 
PC and smartphone markets (the latter the major demand driver for IC since 2011), 
the CCP promoted the development of domestic electronics firms, as Huawei, Lenovo 
and ZTE, while pursuing the implementation of domestic standards. Chinese 3G and 
4G standards and the licensing policy to SOE telecom providers leveraged China’s large 
domestic market to develop domestic IC design firms’ technical capabilities, particu-
larly benefiting Spreadtrum, RDA and Taiwanese Mediatek, while enabling the coun-
try now to “co-shape international mobile telecom standards” (ERNST, 2015, p. 29).
The pursuit of domestic standards was catalyzed in 2006 by the Medium and 
Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020), in whose 
core lies the concept of indigenous innovation and self-reliance rhetoric, aiming to 
reduce technological dependency, especially on the US and Japan, seen as security 
threats (ERNST, 2011). Indigenous innovation, however, does not equal to domestic 
14 Growing from 2.5% to 27.7% of the world fabless market between 2003 and 2016 (Figure 2). This growth 
also started to attract foreign foundries eager to tap the market, breaking a certain reluctance of IC manu-
facturers (and governments) to construct advanced fabs offshore.
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R&D, having an important role for technology import, as expressed in Chinese tele-
com standards, carrying huge chunks of foreign intellectual property. According to 
Ernst (2011), indigenous innovation encompasses original innovation (patent lead-
ing, or just innovation), “integrated innovation” (similar to technology diversifica-
tion), and “re-innovation” (similar to incremental innovation), which “building on 
imported technologies, ‘incremental innovation’ seeks to exploit as much as possible 
the potential of a given “design”, by introducing relatively minor changes to an exist-
ing product or process” (p. 25). Regarding semiconductors, the Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology asserted in 2006 targets for self-sufficiency ratios in IC – 
higher for those in information and national defense security than in communications 
and digital household appliances –, as well as to “basically achieve self-sufficiency in 
the supply of key products” (MIIT apud Ernst, 2011, p. 24).
Despite these policies, ensued by the 2011 State Council Rule 4 substituting 2000’s 
Rule 18, the Chinese consumption-production gap skyrocketed (Graph 1). China’s 
semiconductor consumption grew from 18.5% of the world market, in 2003, to 56.6% 
in 2014 (PWC, 2017). The consumption-production gap rose from U$20.8 billion in 
2003 to U$120.1 billion in 201415 (PWC, 2016). Despite this large gap, an expanding 
demand is fundamental for entering other GVC segments beyond assembling. A re-
stricted domestic market was an important factor to Malaysia’s failure in significantly 
developing manufacturing and R&D, when the country was the main world base for 
semiconductor assembling, before China overtaking it.
Foreign firms captured most of the growth of China’s semiconductor consump-
tion market. In 2014, all top 10 suppliers of China’s market were foreign, namely, Intel, 
Samsung, SK Hynix, Qualcomm, Toshiba, Texas Instruments, STMicroelectronics, 
AMD, Freescale and Renesas (PWC, 2016). In this context, Snowden’s 2013 revelation 
of PRISM, involving Intel and Qualcomm, might have catalyzed the promulgation of 
the 2014 Guidelines for the Promotion of the Development of the National IC Indus-
try (hereafter, the Guidelines).
The 2014 Guidelines have set ambitious targets for China’s IC industry develop-
ment, aiming not to move-up/upgrading in the GVC – which implies the concomitant 
entry/exit in higher/lower value-added productive stages –, but to promote import sub-
stitution, strengthening all stages. The central issue for China’s technological progress 
and value appropriation is not merely GVC product “upgrading”. The mainland already 
has significant insertion in all semiconductor GVC segments (Figure 2), largely mani-
festing that “vertical integration between multinational corporations has created an in-
dustry ecosystem, and Chinese domestic companies can only passively follow behind”, 
whereas “high-level chips are mostly manufactured outside of China” (WEI, 2014, p. 4).
15 Even if the “self-sufficiency” ratio grew from 17% in 2003 to 29% in 2014 (PwC, 2016).
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Source: Adapted from PwC (2017a).
To reach the technological frontier and to vie for the control over the direction and 
pace of technological progress – translated into higher than average profits and, there-
fore, larger shares of value appropriation in the CGV –, China seeks to domestically 
integrate (i) all IC industrial stages along with (ii) the downstream and the upstream 
high-tech sectors of the modern industrial system. In promoting the latter, the Guide-
lines have put greater emphasis at downstream, due to the sector’s advanced stage of 
development compared to the incipient development upstream. One of the Guidelines’ 
basic principles is to “build an industrial chain consisting of ‘integrated circuit chips, 
software, whole units, systems, and information services” (STATE COUNCIL, 2014, 
p. 2).
China has identified the problem with IC insufficient production (production-
consumption gap) “as the critical roadblock to catching up and forging ahead across 
a broad range of China’s leading industries” (ERNST, 2016, p. 9). Insufficient pro-
duction and technology are inextricably intertwined, in as much as the mastery of a 
technology and innovation depend on the essential process of learning in production, 
particularly in manufacturing sectors in which “manufacturability of new products 
is the most critical step in the innovation chain” (CHANG and ANDREONI, 2016, 
p. 20). Therefore, the Guidelines set targets for industry revenues and technology in 
all industry segments, equipment and material. In 2020, China plans to achieve 2014’s 
state-of-the-art manufacturing process technology in mass production (16nm/14nm), 
international leading-edge in AP&T and in key design areas (smartphones/network 
communication/cloud computing/IoT/big data) and to produce key equipment and 
materials (STATE COUNCIL, 2014), whereas MIC 2025 set self-sufficiency ratios for 
2020 in 40% and 70% for 2025.
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The ultimate goal is to achieve advanced international level in the IC industry’s 
main stages by 2030, with few enterprises in the top global firms (STATE COUNCIL, 
2014). The goals, however, are much less ambitious in equipment and materials, the 
upstream sector, which is China’s most backward segment, the hardest to enter and yet 
the most fundamental for controlling technological progress’ pace. In SME, just the 
US, Japan and Europe are important global players. In Tianchun’s (2014) view “China 
does not have to be competitive in all critical areas of equipment and materials – but 
we must develop a few key products in order to give our industry the confidence to 
engage in global technological cooperation and dialogue” (p. 3). Notwithstanding, he 
recognizes that without the upstream sector China will be “unable to grasp the in-
dustry’s decision-making power” (p. 3), providing intelligibility to the export controls 
these goods are still submitted to.
The Guidelines have already qualitatively improved Chinese smartphone suppli-
ers’ global competitive position by raising homegrown IC design capabilities (CHINA 
DAILY, 2017). According to Ernst (2016), an adjustment was implemented to China’s 
semiconductor industrial policy by the MIC 2025 and supporting policy documents, 
with a view to diversify China’s semiconductor products aiming to fulfill the targets as 
the demand-pull from smartphones decelerates, including a push to enter in memory 
and industrial-end market semiconductors. China achieved its 2015 revenue target 
and is likely to fulfill the 40% self-sufficiency ratio by 2020, for in 2016 the ratio was 
36%, up from 17% in 2001 (PWC, 2017). Moreover, the production-consumption gap 
shrunk absolutely in 2015-2016, which had only happened in 2009 since China’s GVC 
integration (PWC, 2017a). Whereas technology targets are contingent to Chinese 
firms, industry’s revenues and self-sufficiency ratios benefit from foreign firms’ opera-
tions. The latter play a key role in China’s strategy, providing technological transfers 
and reducing its imports.
To those ends, China has created large public and private investment funds – the 
latter with significant government influence –, expected to reach U$150 billion over 
the next decade (PCAST, 2017). In 2014-2015, the central and local governments 
set the National IC Fund and several regional funds, respectively. These resources 
have been employed to integrate the IC chain – as Tsinghua Unigroup fund’s acqui-
sitions aiming to build an IDM ecosystem – and to pursue domestic consolidation 
and investment in domestic leaders, with a view to increase firms’ capacity to engage 
in large R&D expenditures, upgrade facilities and contour fabrication’s high capital 
requirements and longer investment maturation (CS, 2016; EUCCC, 2017). Consoli-
dation also seeks to augment China’s market power vis-à-vis international suppliers 
in the GVC.
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Furthermore, the funds served an aggressive pursuit for foreign acquisitions16, 
seeking to obtain critical technology. Such road has been quickly blocked in the US 
– by the Commission on Foreign Investment in the US –, South Korea, Taiwan and 
growingly in the EU17 and Japan, the latter under substantial US pressure. However, 
the blockage cannot impede technology import. Ernst (2016) highlights that at least 
Tsinghua developed sophisticated strategies to acquire critical technology, while sev-
eral leading global firms would be betting on Chinese policies’ success: “in fact, U.S. 
and other foreign firms are quite explicit that they might accede to Chinese demands 
to transfer technology and form joint ventures with its firms, if only they could expand 
or at least sustain their share of the China market” (p. 18-19).
In mediating the access of foreign firms to China’s market, the government has 
been using a series of tools – such as procurement, security legislations, anti-monop-
oly law and propaganda – to acquire technology, disclose information, localize foreign 
firms, reduce royalty payments and substitute domestic for foreign technology where 
domestic capabilities exist. The use of these tools imbricates national security and eco-
nomic reasons. After PRISM revelation, the Chinese government has drafted/passed, 
in 2015/2016, the National Security Law, the new banking and insurance regulations, 
the Cybersecurity Law and the Antiterrorist Law, emphasizing the use of “secure and 
controllable” technologies. By privileging and subsidizing domestic products and 
technologies, these legislations/drafts have put under discussion the need for foreign 
firms to locally store data, disclose software source-codes to the government, as well 
as encryption keys in case of investigations and implement software and hardware 
backdoors for governmental access, particularly in the banking and insurance sector 
(MOZUR, 2015; DOU, 2016).
US tech giants have been put under legal and ideological pressure. Qualcomm was 
fined in U$ 975 million in 2015 in the Chinese anti-monopoly law for higher than 
average royalty rates and for forcing combined licensing (MCCORMICK, 2015). As a 
result, the company paid the due, reduced royalties and later entered in a joint-venture 
with a Chinese firm. In 2013, Cisco, IBM, Google, Qualcomm, Intel, Apple, Microsoft 
and Oracle were named US’ eight “guardian warriors”, by the China Economic Week-
ly’s cover, which had discreetly infiltrated in the country (ROSEN and BAO, 2013). It 
rapidly spread across the Chinese media with claims to the public for acquiring do-
16 Prior to 2013, China had made six investments in US semiconductor firms, totaling U$214 million; from 
2013 to late 2016, the rumored, attempted and successful investments were 27, totaling U$37 billion 
(RHODIUM GROUP apud EUCCC, 2017).
17 The European Union Commercial Chamber in China (2017) concerns with Chinese acquisitions points 
to the Silex Microelectronics’ case, a Sweden semiconductor company that ultimately felt in the hands of 
Beijing Navgness Integration, which subsequently entered in joint venture with the PLA.
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mestic products and technologies. Notwithstanding, there is a limit to these pressures 
as China still lags significantly behind in IC production and technology, depending on 
strategic partnerships with foreign firms to reduce its import dependency and absorb 
technology as well as to modernize its military and its capacity to face asymmetrical 
warfare.
Furthermore, Chinese technological achievements in the commercial sector are 
explicitly pursued in the attempt to raise military capabilities, concerning especially 
the US and Taiwan. China’s IC industrial policies alarmed and prompted countering 
measures from major players. Without dispensing opposing Chinese “damaging” in-
dustrial policies, the US understand that maintaining its semiconductor leadership 
cannot be sustained on that, and has called for pursuing “moon shots”, or ambitious 
challenges coordinating the innovation system (PCAST, 2017).
6. CONCLUSION
Despite neoliberal policies and rhetoric being impinged upon the world by the US 
and the EU over the last decades, industrial policy never was in question in strategic 
sectors. Significant technological semiconductor advancements are a crucial dimen-
sion of economic and military power. China has advanced several important steps in 
semiconductor production and in decreasing its dependency. Nonetheless, China is 
still distant from meeting its consumption needs and the technological frontier in de-
sign and manufacturing. Despite circumventing US export controls in SME, imports 
of state-of-the-art fab machinery were not made by Chinese headquartered firms (still 
two generations behind the leading-edge). Rather, they were made to establish facili-
ties for companies as Intel and Samsung. In crucial SME, China is still much behind 
Japan, the US and Europe. This becomes more critical as Chinese headquartered semi-
conductor manufacturing firms push to reach leading-edge, given the security aspects 
referred before and the blockages derived from those goods subordinated to power 
strategies (strategic trade). However, China has its domestic market as bargaining 
power, the fact of being the major IC consumer and, consequently, the largest market 
for the production of semiconductors and their equipment. The ongoing strategy aims 
to take advantage of this technological opportunity, and it has already prompted stra-
tegic reactions from major players.
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